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Introduction
Categorization was long considered a reflection of the environment, with little variability
from one individual to another. However, it is now studied from a differential perspective
and is believed to express specific concepts of the world associated with developmental
level, experience and subjects’ personal characteristics. As a result, categorization tasks
can be used to understand the concepts of groups of individuals in relation to a specific
field.   It  is this perspective that we are taking in this paper,  in which we compare a
control group with groups of eating disorder patients (anorexia, bulimia). We examine
their classification of food items into categories and the properties they express to justify
these classifications.
Relationship between categorization and concepts of the world
In response to categorization theories claiming that the content of categories reflects
environmental properties, e.g. exemplar theory (for example, Medin & Schaffer, 1978;
Medin & Smith, 1984; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986; Smith & Medin, 1981) and prototype theory
(Rosch, 1973; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), the theory stating that conceptual consistency is the
major characteristic of natural categories was inspired by the first article published by
Murphy and Medin (1985). The component properties of categories are linked not only by
empirical relationships by also by causal interpretations (birds fly and eat insects, of course,
but they also eat insects because they can fly). Therefore, objects placed in the same category
are believed to be essentially the same (Medin & Ortony, 1989).
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In fact, the categorization task seems to be very sensitive to underlying theories about
individuals. Some researchers (Ahn, 1991; Ahn, Brewer & Mooney, 1992; Hayes & Taplin,
1995;  Medin,  1989;  Medin,  Wattenmaker,  &  Hampson,  1987;  Wattenmaker,  Dewey,
Murphy, & Medin, 1986; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994) have tested children’s naïve theories
by giving them information that  might influence their  categorization judgments.  For
example, Carey (1985) observes that when children are asked to choose the objects that
seem most human to them, they select a toy that represents a monkey more often than a real
monkey. However, when told that human beings have moods, they infer that real monkeys, but
not  toys,  have  moods.  They  thus  modify  their  similarity  judgment  toward these  three
objects. Keil (1989) tells the children a story in which scientists discover an animal that
looks like a raccoon, but which has the internal organs of a polecat and which, moreover,
has polecat parents and children. The older the children, the more likely they are to say
that this animal is a polecat and not a raccoon, from which the authors conclude that the
children are more likely to create categories based on theories of heredity or biology than
on animals’ visual appearance. The functional properties inferred therefore take priority
over immediately perceived properties. 
Many studies have been conducted on the basis of this perspective, e.g. the idea that
categories reflect one’s concept of the world. One field of study concerns developmental
research, which investigates babies’  and children’s conception of physical objects and
emphasizes the role of intuitive theories in conceptual development (Carey, 1985; Hayes,
Goodhew, Heit & Gillan, 2003; Lautrey & Mazens, 2004; Nelson, 1985; Spelke, Breinlinger,
Macomber & Jacobson, 1992). In a related field of study, specialists in the didactics of
physics (Vosniadou, 1994) and the didactics of mathematics (Fishbeim, 1994) underscore
the importance of naïve theories, constructed on the basis of experience and culture, and
the role they play in the acquisition of  scientific concepts.  All  these authors use the
notion of conceptual change and show that primitive concepts resist change and often
coexist  with  scientific  knowledge.  A  third  category  of  investigation  relates  to
anthropological research that studies categorization as a function of cultural contexts
and examines the differences between natural  categories and scientific  concepts (see
Malt, 1995, for a review of the issue; Lopez, Atyran, Coley, Medin & Smith, 1997; Medin &
Atran, 2004) and particularly the differences in category extensions resulting not only
from their morphological differences but also from the objects’ usefulness (Hunn, 1977).
According to the Kamals of the Philippines, for example, the category tree includes small,
highly branched plants used to make fire, but excludes plants with a trunk (such as palm
trees), which have other uses (their fruit). This population’s equivalent for the word tree
thus designates any plant used to make fire. As a result of this research, the now widely
shared idea gradually emerged that categories reflect not only environmental properties
but also objects’  functional  properties  based on how they are used.  These functional
properties  are  based  on  experience,  cultural  representations  (for  example,  what  is
considered edible and non-edible) and the expertise acquired in a professional field that
makes certain properties more salient and constructs new properties as well. This point
of view underlies the notion of ad hoc categorization proposed by Barsalou (Barsalou,
1989;  Barsalou  &  Medin,  1986).  For  example,  Medin,  Lynch,  Coley  &  Atran  (1997)
compared the way three occupational categories (scientists, maintenance workers and
landscapers) classify trees and the properties they assign to these classes. The researchers
observed  major  areas  of  agreement  as  well  as  marked  differences  in  the  relative
importance these occupations attach to the various properties. Landscapers, for example,
attach more importance to morphological and ornamental properties than to biological
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properties, with which they are nevertheless familiar. Previous research in the field of
education had shown that experts classify problems differently from novices in the fields
of physics (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981) and mathematics (Silver, 1981). Experts classify
problems as a function of the solution principle, while novices group them according to
their surface properties (type of object or mechanism, nature of semantic relationships).
As such, the differences that appear in subjects’ categories when they are asked to classify
objects  reveal  the properties  most  salient  to them and thus the interest,  values  and
concepts attached to these properties. But how does this apply to food representations?
Categorization and food representations
There has  been little  research into food categorization.  However,  it  is  reasonable  to
assume that these biological categories are relevant when investigating certain aspects of
an individual’s concept of the world. Studying these real-world concepts seems pertinent
because food is a subject of interest to every one of us. Everyone eats and smells food,
reads and talks about it, and plans meals. In studies of biological categories, researchers
have examined representations of plants and animals (see Lopez, Atyran, Coley, Medin &
Smith, 1997) even though few animals and plants are seen on a daily basis. They are not
central to the thoughts and activities of most urban dwellers, and much of our knowledge
about such categories comes from observation and communication with others, rather
than the direct interaction we have with food. 
Concerning eating disorder patients, food categories seem particularly pertinent to the
food domain because food is a major preoccupation among these individuals. Research
that focuses on food preferences (Brown, Waller, Meyer, Bamford, Morrison & Burdith,
2003; Drewnowski, Bellisle, Aimez & Remy, 1987; Lindeman & Stark, 2000; Leung, Waller &
Thomas, 2003) demonstrates a rationalization process in the food behaviors of eating
disorder patients that leads to singular food practices and exacerbated food behaviors.
Food behaviors are associated with very strong concepts among all human beings. 
Every culture, every human group has its own cuisine and eating habits and thus a set of
representations, beliefs and practices shared by the individuals in the same group. These
factors determine classifications and the rules governing food preparation, combinations,
gathering and consumption (Fischler, 1990). Cultures, for example, define the parameters
for “disgusting,” which refers to food that is “not pleasant to think about” (Lévi-Strauss,
1962). The food is rejected, therefore, on a purely cognitive or ideational level, e.g. the
very thought of eating the substance provokes revulsion as a result of beliefs concerning
its nature, origin and affect on the body. Eating disorder patients, for example, perceive
food as “pharmakons,” sometimes good for their bodies, but also poisons that can destroy
them,  make  them suffer  and  be  the  source  of  danger.  Therefore,  one  would  expect
patients  with  eating  disorders  to  have  specific,  pronounced  beliefs  that  manifest
themselves because these patients do not categorize food in the same way as others.
The differences in cognitive representations among pathological groups
Many studies have shown that pathological groups are distinguished by differences in
cognitive processing related to semantic memory, particularly categorization, semantic
judgments and access to meaning. These studies,  however concern almost exclusively
organic disorders, such as brain lesions (Bulla-Helwig, Ettlinger, Dommash & Ebel, 1993;
Grossman  &  Wilson,  1987;  Hirst  &  Volpe,  1988);  amnesia  (Warrington,  1975);  and
Alzheimer’s disease (Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp & Romani, 1990; Chertkow, Bub & Camplan,
1992;  Dixon,  Bub,  Chertkow & Arguin,  1999;  Fung,  Chertkow & Templeman,  2000).  A
considerably smaller number of studies address categorization, even food categorization
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(Richard  &  Urdapilleta,  2004;  Urdapilleta,  Mirabel-Sarron,  Meunier  &  Richard,  2005;
Urdapilleta, Mirabel-Sarron, Heron-Benaicha, & Richard, 2003) in eating disorders despite
their importance at the individual and cultural levels.
The purpose of the following experiment is to demonstrate the differences in the way
experimental groups categorize food names and the reasons expressed to justify these
categories. 
MethodsParticipants
A total of 159 French women participated in this experiment in the same conditions of
time and place (Clinique des Maladies Mentales et de l’Encéphale, Paris). There were 73
controls  and 86 eating disorder  patients  (38 anorexics,  18  bulimics  and 30 anorexic-
bulimics); the patients’ ages ranged from 20-33 years (mean age = 24.7). Patients were
divided into three groups using the diagnostic criteria of the World Health Organization
(ICD10, Note 1). The BMIs (Note 2) of controls (mean = 20.5), bulimics (mean = 21.1) and
anorexic-bulimics (mean = 19.4) ranged from 18 to 22 and the BMIs of anorexics ranged
from 15 to 17 (average = 15.8). A questionnaire was used to verify that controls did not
suffer from an eating disorder (Eating Attitude Test 40 – Garner & Garfinkel, 1979).
Materials
A typed list of 27 food names, presented in alphabetical order (i.e. Urdapilleta, Mirabel-
Sarron, Meunier & Richard, 2005). These foods belong to major food categories noted for
their nutritional value, and are consumer products common to any French person. The
foods are as follows: Apple, banana, beef, beet, bread, cheese, canned fruits, chocolate,
cold cuts, endive, cookie, cream cheese, dessert cream, egg, fish, fruit juice, fruit tart,
mayonnaise, milk, muffin, pear, peas, rice, potato, poultry, tomato, and yogurt.
Procedure
The procedure is comprised of two stages: a task in which subjects group 27 food names
into different piles (no limit on the number of piles), thereby expressing the similarity of
food items in each pile; and a verbalization task.
The instructions are as follows: “You are going to be presented with a list of 27 food
names. Your task is to classify the foods that go together – in other words, those that are
similar.” Then they are asked to “describe each pile and how the foods in each pile are
similar.”
Data analysis
The purpose of the analysis is to compare the categorizations of food names by the four
groups  of  participants –  controls,  anorexics,  bulimics  and  anorexic-bulimics –  and  to
understand the reasons for the categories observed. 
The categorization task 
The participants grouped the 27 food names into a certain number of piles, classifying
one after another. The number of piles and the number of food items per pile differed
among participants, so we constructed a dissimilarity matrix. We developed the matrix by
calculating the pairing frequency for all pairs of food (or object) names, e.g. the number
of times two objects were put in the same class. The pairing frequency is a measurement
of the proximity of two objects. The more often a pair of objects is placed in the same
class, the more stable the association between the two objects. The similarity index of two
objects is defined as the number of times two objects are assigned to the same category.
One then constructs a similarity table of “x” columns by “x” rows (“x” being the number
of objects, in this case 27). For each pair of objects, one indicates the frequency of this
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pair in each class, e.g. the number of subjects who put both items of the pair in the same
class. The similarity index thus has a minimum value of 0 (none of the participants placed
the  two objects  of  the  pair  in  the  same category)  and  its  maximum value  is  N  (all
participants  put  the two objects  of  the  pair  in  the same class).  On the basis  of  this
similarity matrix, we then constructed a dissimilarity matrix in order to perform an MDS
Multidimensional  analysis  (Kruskal  &  Wish,  1991)  using  SPSS  software  (Note  4).  The
purpose of this multidimensional analysis is to search for a configuration of points, here
representing food names, in a space of size X in which the distances in this space best fit
the perceived distances expressed by the dissimilarity matrix.  The ALSCAL algorithm
(non-metric Alternating Least-Square sCALing) was used. Two parameters were examined
to evaluate the degree of fit between the original data and the final configuration: the
Stress S criterion (or Kruskal’s Stress) and the RSQ coefficient. The value of S is defined by
the following formula:
where d
if
  represents the distance between i and j in the MDS space and 
Image2
 the
distance  that  best  fits  the  similarity  between i and  j.  A  lower  S  means  a  better  fit.
According to Kruskal (1964), the goodness of fit is satisfactory if the Stress value is lower
than or  equal  to approximately 10%.  This  Stress  value is  indissociable from the RSQ
coefficient, which is the correlation coefficient between the dissimilarity (of the original
data)  and  the  (calculated)  distance  between  objects  in  the  multidimensional
representation  space.  An RSQ close  to  1  means  a  better  fit  in  the  multidimensional
representation.  The  Stress  value  and  the  RSQ  coefficient  allow  us  to  determine  the
number of optimal dimensions for representing dissimilarities between foods.
We  also  conducted  a  hierarchical  ascending  classification  (Euclidian  distances  and
minimal gap or “single linkage”) on the MDS axes (Giboreau, Navarro, Faye & Dumortier,
2001),  which  allowed us  to  group together  foods  that  have  close  coordinates  in  the
multidimensional  space,  meaning  they  are  similarly  perceived  by  the  subjects.  The
histogram of the level index is useful for indicating a certain “natural discontinuity” in
terms of distances between objects observed and allows us to interpret the data resulting
from the MDS. The histogram of the level index indicates the loss of inertia when an
additional class is considered in the partition. A large gap in the histogram indicates the
index corresponding to the number of classes that have to be retained (Lebart, Morineau
& Piron, 1995).
Verbalizations
Concerning the verbalization of properties common to the names of foods in the same
category,  the data analysis  was  performed using Le Sphynx Lexica software (Note  5).
During  the  first  stage,  the  entire  corpus  was  lemmatized:  lemmatization  involves
reducing an initial lexicon to a smaller lexicon. Thus, each written word form is replaced
by  its  base  form  or  root;  singulars  and  plurals  are  grouped  together,  the  different
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inflexions of the verb “to be,” for example, are replaced by the infinitive, etc. During the
second stage,  we used lexical  statistics  and calculated the number of  occurrences  of
words in the corpus. We then constructed a table by food item and by subject. For each
food name and a given group of subjects (anorexics, for example), only those properties
with an occurrence rate of more than 45% were taken into account. This means that the
given property was expressed by at least three out of four participants. Let’s take an
example: the property, good for the digestive tract, was used 28 times by the 38 anorexic
participants  for  the  word,  “pear,”  so  it  was  retained.  We  present  below  only  those
analyses of verbalizations that allowed us to interpret the axes of the MDS analysis. The
interpretation of the axes takes into account all properties expressed for all items in a
specific category. For example, with respect to the control group and the interpretation
of axis 2 in the MDS analysis for fruits and vegetables (C1, C5),  three-quarters of the
participants verbalized the following properties: “natural, grow, carbohydrates, lipids, fiber,
minerals, vitamins, produced on farms and provide calcium.” 
ResultsThe model’s goodness-of-fit to the data
Table 1  presents  the variation of  the Stress  S  criterion and the RSQ coefficient  as  a
function of the number of dimensions in the model.
 
Table 1. Stress and RSQ in relation to the number of dimensions of the MDS mode
With respect to the control group, two dimensions resulted in a highly satisfactory stress
criterion (6%) and an RSQ close to 1 (98%). Concerning the three experimental groups, it
appears that three dimensions led to an acceptable compromise, with stress criteria of
around 10% (anorexics: 11%; bulimics: 9%; anorexic-bulimics: 10%) and RSQs close to 1
(anorexics: 89%; bulimics: 95%; anorexic-bulimics: 93%).
Hierarchical ascending classification
In this experiment, we were interested in the differences manifested by the different
groups of participants in their grouping of foods by category. We based this analysis on
the classes provided by the hierarchical ascending classification, using as a criterion the
cluster level for which the cluster analysis presents the maximum gap.
The experimental groups categorized 11 of the 27 foods differently from the controls. The
foods were: bread, canned fruits, cold cuts, cream cheese, dessert cream, fruit juice, fish,
mayonnaise, potato, poultry, yogurt. We are now going to examine these classifications in
detail.
The control group (cf. figure 1) divided the foods into five categories that included a large
number of items (C1: vegetables; C2: cheese and dairy products; C5: desserts; C6: fruits)
and one that was more heterogeneous (C4), which included meat, fish, eggs, cold cuts and
accompaniments. There was also a sixth category (C3) that had only one element: fruit
juice.
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Figure1. Dendogram of the cluster analysis conducted on the coordinates of the food names on MDS
dimensions for the control group.
The anorexic group (cf. figure 2) divided the foods into five categories that included a large
number of  items (C1:  vegetables;  C2:  cheese,  bread and dairy products;  C4:  meat;  C5:
desserts; C6: fruits) plus four categories that had one or two items (cream cheese, cold
cuts and mayonnaise, dessert cream, potato). The C1 category differed from that of the
control group due to the absence of potatoes, which formed a separate class. In category
C4, cold cuts and mayonnaise as well as bread were absent. Cold cuts and mayonnaise were in
a separate category, while bread belonged to category C2, which included camembert,
milk  and  yogurt.  Canned  fruits  and  fruit  juice were  placed  in  category  C6,  which  is
comprised  of  fruits.  Dessert  cream and  canned  fruits were  therefore  not  included  in
category C5, the dessert category, and dessert cream thus remained in a class of its own,
just like cream cheese. 
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Figure 2. Dendogram of the cluster analysis conducted on the coordinates of the food names on MDS
dimensions for the anorexic group.
The bulimic group (cf. figure 3) also divided the foods into five homogeneous categories
(C1: vegetables; C2: cheese and dairy products; C4: meat; C5: desserts; C6: fruits) plus three
categories  with  one  or  two  items  each  (dessert  cream,  cream  cheese,  bread  and
mayonnaise). The mayonnaise and bread were absent from category C4; instead, they make
up a separate category. The bulimics, like the anorexics, placed canned fruits and fruit juice
in category C6, the fruit category. Dessert cream was a distinct category. Cream cheese was
not placed in C2, but in its own category. 
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Figure 3. Dendogram of the cluster analysis conducted on the coordinates of the food names on MDS
dimensions for the bulimic group.
The  group of  anorexic-bulimics (cf.  figure 4)  divided foods into six  categories.  Fish and
poultry appeared in category C1, together with vegetables; as a result, they were absent
from category C4. This group, like the anorexics and bulimics, included not only fruit but
also canned fruits and fruit juice in category C6. Cream cheese was classified with yogurt;
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they formed a separate category. Finally, category C4 was comprised of cheese, milk, bread,
mayonnaise, cold cuts, eggs and beef.
Figure 4. Dendogram of the cluster analysis conducted on the coordinates of the food names on MDS
dimensions for the anorexic-bulimic group.
Most of the foods were placed in the same class by all the groups (16 out of 27), but a
relatively large number of foods were classified differently. The groups agreed on the
following  categories:  vegetables,  beef,  eggs,  raw  fruit  (banana,  pear  and  apple)  and
prepared desserts (chocolate, muffin, cookies and fruit tart). We now turn our attention
to the food characteristics that comprise the different groups. The fact that some groups,
but not others, place certain foods in a category and vice versa, and the fact that some
groups,  but  not  others,  exclude  certain  foods  from a  category  may  signify  that  the
properties used for creating consensual categories are not necessarily the same for the
different  groups.  We  must  therefore  examine  which  properties  each  group  uses  to
differentiate the categories. To that end, we will use the verbalization data and the results
of the multidimensional analysis.
MDS multidimensional analysis
We present below the MDS multidimensional analysis with regard to the verbalizations
and hierarchical ascending classifications. They help us distinguish the properties that
define the axes.  These properties structure the relationships between categories.  The
classes are indicated on the factorial graphs corresponding to axes 1 and 2 and 2 and 3
(figures 5-11).
Control  group  (cf.  figure  5).  Axis  1  contrasts  categories  (C1,  C4)  defined  by  the
composition of foods (carbohydrates, complex sugars, animal fats, proteins, etc.), their
method  of  consumption  (cooked,  raw,  cold,  hot,  as  an  accompaniment,  etc.)  with
categories (C5, C6) defined by the circumstances of consumption of these foods (any time,
in winter, as a snack, in a restaurant, etc.). Axis 2 contrasts natural foods that grow, e.g.
fruits  and vegetables  (C1,  C5)  that  provide  carbohydrates,  lipids,  fiber,  minerals  and
What categorization tells us about food representation
Current psychology letters, 17, Vol. 3, 2005 | 2005
10
vitamins, with food produced on farms, e.g. cheese and dairy products (C2) that provide
calcium. 
Figure 5. MDS multidimensional analysis of the control group
The anorexic  group (cf.  figures 6 and 7).  Axis 1 contrasts cream cheese,  an artificial  and
chemical food with categories defined by the need to consume the foods that comprise them
because they are essential for the body (C4: eggs, beef, poultry, fish). Axis 2 is defined by the
effect of foods on the body. These are foods that people should eat (fruit (C6) is good for the
digestive tract, easy for the body to absorb, beneficial for the body) as opposed to foods that
people should not eat (dessert creams and cold cuts). Axis 3 is defined by the right that
anorexic patients grant themselves or not to consume these foods (I can or cannot, I must or
must not eat them). Yogurt (C2), for example, must be consumed, while fruit tarts and
other desserts (C5) must not be eaten.
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Figures 6 and 7. MDS multidimensional analysis of the anorexic group 
The  bulimic  group (cf.  figures  8  and 9).  Axis  1  contrasts  animal-based foods  (C2:  dairy
products + cream cheese) that do not need to be chewed and are soft with plant-based foods
(C1: vegetables), which must be chewed. Axis 2 contrasts necessary foods (C4: meat and fish)
with foods that are forbidden because they are fattening or processed (C5: dessert + cream
cheese). Axis 3 contrasts disliked foods that are eaten out of necessity (C1: vegetables) with
liked foods that are eaten with pleasure (C6: fruits + dessert creams).
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Figures 8 and 9. MDS multidimensional analysis of the bulimic group.
The anorexic-bulimic group (cf. figures 10 and 11). Axis 1 contrasts foods consumed during
bulimic binge eating (C5: desserts) with foods consumed during meals (C1: vegetables, fish
and poultry). Axis 2 contrasts animal-based foods (C4) that have high protein content but are
also high in fat, with fruits (C6), which are high in water and vitamin content. Axis 3 contrasts
foods consumed during bulimic binge eating,  but which are  eaten alone (cream cheese and
yogurt), with foods consumed during bulimic binge eating but are eaten with friends and family
(C5).
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Figures10 and 11. MDS multidimensional analysis of the anorexic-bulimic group 
Conclusion
This  experiment  provides  valuable  information  concerning  the  food  representations
associated  with  27  commonly  consumed  foods. Controls,  anorexics,  bulimics  and
anorexic-bulimics take very different properties into account when categorizing food
names. The food representations of anorexic, bulimic and anorexic-bulimic patients are
based on the consequences of ingestion in terms of weight gain and digestion. But the
three  groups  of  patients  also  differ:  anorexics’  categorization  criteria  are  guided  by
deontic  properties;  those  of  bulimics  by  hedonic  properties;  and  those  of  anorexic-
bulimics  are  associated  with  the  compulsive  food  behaviors  characteristic  of  these
patients. However, all these foods are included in functional scripts by the three groups
of  patients,  e.g.  “These  foods  must  be  eaten  or  avoided.”  The  control  group’s  food
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categories are very different. They map onto common taxonomic (composition of foods or
categorization based on whether  they  are  processed or  natural  products)  and script
categories of foods (consumption method and circumstances) evidenced by individuals
even at a very young age. For example, Nguyen & Murphy (2003) show that, for children,
“eggs and cereal are both in the script category of breakfast foods, not because they are
spatially or temporally contiguous (like the leash and dog), but because they play the
same part  as  an  event  schema (what  is  eaten  for  breakfast).  Ross  & Murphy (1999)
demonstrate that while adults assign foods to many different classification systems, they
particularly classify them by taxonomic and biological properties as well as properties
associated with the consumption context (when the food is eaten, how it’s eaten, how it’s
prepared) – in other words, according to script relations. For example, adults in the study
considered a bagel to both bread (a taxonomic category) and a breakfast food (a script
category). In fact, food is the only domain we are aware of that has been shown to have
both strong taxonomic and script-based categories in adults and children.
We might inquire into the function of these script and taxonomic categories, which seem
to  be  affected  by  eating  pathologies.  In  fact,  based  on the  work  of  certain  authors
(Anderson, 1991; Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998; Phillips, 2000; Rehder & Hatie, 2004; Ross &
Murphy, 1999), it can be concluded that categories serve not only to classify objects, but
also –  and  most  importantly –  to  make  inferences.  According  to  Ross  &  Murphy,
categories provide responses to such questions as, “What kind of snack can I have at the
movie?” and “What would you like for breakfast?” These are questions commonly asked
by control subjects and the categories of greatest significance to this population are those
that are most relevant to making appropriate choices in furtherance of such goals. But it
appears  that  subjects  with  eating  disorders  do  not  have  the  same  concerns:  their
inferences about food are associated with their illness and personal experiences: “This
food is going to make me fat, give me a stomach ache”; “I have to eat this food when I’m
alone” (during binge eating) or “with someone else” (at other times).  Therefore,  it  is
reasonable to assume that food pathologies affect not only food categorization but also
the scripts associated with it: food representations guide food practices and vice versa –
practices also depend on representations, resulting in the differences observed among
the  experimental  groups.  Food  representations  are  dynamic;  they  are  based  on
experience with food and serve as models that determine what is “okay to eat.”
We believe that studying the cognitive determinants of eating disorders is a promising
avenue  for  basic  research  (knowledge  of  categorization  processes  as  well  as  such
corollary processes as representations, belief formation, etc.), clinical practice (detection
of vulnerability or predisposition) and therapeutic practice (best treatment strategies and
taking  these  dysfunctions  into  account  during  therapy).  Other  studies  are  currently
underway to evaluate whether this change in categorization only affects food stimuli or
the perception of other objects as well. 
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NOTES
#Notes
1.  ICD10/CIMD.  (1997).  Classification  internationale  des  troubles  mentaux  et  des  troubles  du
comportement: critères diagnostiques pour la recherche. Paris: Masson.
2. The BMI (Body Mass Index) is calculated as follows: weight (in kilograms) divided by height² (in
meters). 
3. SPSS version 10.1.3. Copyright© SPSS Inc., 1989-2000.
4. Le Sphinx PSS Copyright© Sphinx Développement, 1986-1999.
ABSTRACTS
This study uses a categorization task to demonstrate representations and beliefs about different
types of food by eating disorder subjects and a control group. Participants (n=173) were asked to
classify 27 nouns designating foods in terms of similarities and differences, and then to verbally
express the criteria used for their classification. We expected to find between-group differences
in terms of properties used for classification. The results confirmed this hypothesis. Unlike the
control group, the patients did not create categories based on socially shared knowledge; instead,
they tended to create categories based on their relationship to the world and their pathology. We
discuss the benefits of this task for demonstrating representations.
Nous présentons une expérimentation qui vise, en utilisant une tâche de catégorisation, à étudier
les représentations d’aliments d’un groupe de jeunes filles souffrant de troubles de conduites
alimentaires  et  d’un  groupe  témoin.  Les  participantes  (n=173)  effectuent  une  tâche  de
classification  de  27  noms  d’aliments  en  fonction  de  leurs  similarités  et  différences  puis
expliquent les critères utilisés pour réaliser cette classification. Les résultats montrent que les
propriétés utilisées par les différents groupes de participantes sont différentes. Contrairement au
groupe témoin, les patientes souffrant de troubles des conduits alimentaires ne catégorisent pas
en fonction de connaissances socialement partagées mais en fonction de leur relation au monde
et de leur pathologie. Nous discutons des apports d’une tâche de catégorisation pour mettre en
évidence des représentations.
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